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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MCQUITTYv. SPANGLER: A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF DUTY
TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT REQUIRE
EVIDENCE OF A PHYSICAL INVASION.
By: Heather Pensyl

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it is not necessary to
prove that a physical invasion occurred in order to bring a claim
for breach of informed consent. McQuitty v. Spangler, 410 Md. 1, 976
A.2d 1020 (2009). Specifically, the court held that a sufficient claim
for lack of informed consent arose when a physician failed to provide
the patient with material information necessary to make a treatment
decision, regardless of the presence of any physical invasion. ld. at 5,
976 A.2d at 1022.
On March 30, 1995, while twenty-eight weeks pregnant, Peggy
McQuitty experienced a premature separation of the placenta from the
uterus, known as a partial placental abruption. Mrs. McQuitty's
attending physician, Dr. Donald Spangler, advised Mrs. McQuitty that
a scheduled Cesarean Section delivery would be necessary. The
timing of such posed a dilemma, however, because any further delay
would increase the risk of additional separation of the placenta, and a
complete abruption would cause the death of the fetus. Yet, if Dr.
Spangler delivered the baby immediately, the fetus' lung immaturity
also posed a risk of death. Accordingly, Dr. Spangler developed a
management plan to delay the delivery, and Mrs. McQuitty consented
to this plan.
About a week and a half later, a new abruption occurred, which
was followed by further complications. Dr. Spangler never presented
the option of delivering the baby, nor did he advise Mrs. McQuitty of
the additional risks associated with the new complications. On May 8,
1995, a complete abruption occurred and Dr. Spangler conducted an
emergency Cesarean Section. The complete abruption caused the
child's severe cerebral palsy, which, according to testimony at trial,
could have been avoided had the baby been delivered sooner.
On September 5, 2001, Mrs. McQuitty and her husband filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Dr.
Spangler for malpractice and breach of the duty to obtain informed
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consent. During the trial, the jury reached a verdict regarding the
malpractice claim, but failed to do so regarding the informed consent
claim. Two years later, at a second trial, addressing only the issue of
informed consent, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the McQuittys
and awarded damages of $13,078,515. However, the judge granted
Dr. Spangler's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
basis that there was no "affirmative violation of Mrs. McQuitty's
physical integrity." The McQuittys appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the trial court's holding. The
McQuittys then petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ
of certiorari, which the court granted.
In its analysis of the case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
addressed the following issues related to informed consent: (1)
whether a physician's withholding of material information from his
patient, concerning changes in medical status, would give rise to an
informed consent claim by negating any prior consent given regarding
treatment, and (2) whether, under Maryland law, an informed consent
claim could exist in the absence of damages caused by battery.
McQuitty, 410 Md. at 4, 976 A.2d at 1022.
First, the court noted that in order to be effective, consent must be
informed. /d. at 19,976 A.2d at 1031. Informed consent requires that
a physician provide all information material to the patient's decision to
pursue a particular line of treatment. /d. (citing Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019-20 (1977)). Additionally,
informed consent includes a duty to warn the patient of any material
risks or dangers that correlate with such treatment. /d. at 21, 976 A.2d
at 1032. This duty does not require that the physician inform the
patient of all risks; the physician must only disclose those that the
physician knows, or ought to know, that a reasonable patient would
find important in making his or her decision. /d. (quoting Sard, 281
Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022). Thus, as in Mrs. McQuitty's case,
when a physician fails to inform the patient of changes in
circumstances and how those changes affect the risks inherent in a
course of treatment, an informed consent claim arises. /d. at 3, 5, 976
A.2d at 1021-22.
The court then addressed whether a physical invasion requirement
exists under the doctrine of informed consent. McQuitty, 410 Md. at
17, 976 A.2d at 1029. Dr. Spangler argued that the duty to obtain
informed consent arises only when a physician proposes a treatment
involving an "affirmative violation of the patient's physical
integrity." Id. at 18, 976 A.2d at 1030 (quoting Land v. Zorn, 389
Md. 206, 230, 884 A.2d 142, 156 (2005); Reed v. Compagnolo, 332
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Md. 226, 242, 630 A.2d 1145, 1153 (1993)). In rejecting Dr.
Spangler's argument, the court relied on the historical common law
basis for an informed consent claim. !d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035. As
early as 1767, an informed consent claim could be pled on the case.
!d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035 (citing Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95
Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767)). This cause of action was a precursor to
negligence, rather than an action in battery. !d. (citing Slater, 95 Eng.
Rep. 860). Thus, traditionally, the gravamen of a claim for lack of
informed consent rested in the physician's duty to obtain consent to
treatment. !d. at 28, 976 A.2d at 1036. Subsequent courts have
interpreted this as a duty to provide the patient with all material
information relevant to the patient's decision to pursue treatment.
McQuitty, 410 Md. at 31, 976 A.2d at 1038 (citing Sard, 281 Md. at
444,372 A.2d at 1022).
Next, the court analyzed Reed v. Carnpagnolo, wherein it held that
a physician's failure to offer diagnostic tests should be analyzed under
the professional standard of care, not the doctrine of informed consent.
!d. at 25, 976 A.2d at 1034-35 (citing Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md.
226, 242-43, 630 A.2d 1143, 1152-53 (1993)). Additionally, the court
in Reed held that the duty to obtain informed consent only arose when
a physician failed to obtain consent to some treatment. !d. at 23, 976
A.2d at 1033 (citing Reed, 332 Md. at 241, 630 A.2d at 1152). In an
attempt to distinguish the situation under which the doctrine of
informed consent applied from a medical malpractice claim, the Reed
court referenced Karlsons v. Guerino/, which held that an informed
consent claim could not exist without '"an affirmative violation of the
patient's physical integrity."' !d. at 22, 976 A.2d at 1032-33 (quoting
Karlsons v. Guerino/, 57 A.D.2d. 73, 82, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977)). This reference to Karlsons departed from the
common law basis for an informed consent claim, and resulted in the
view that an informed consent claim necessitated the additional
element of a physical invasion. !d. at 26, 976 A.2d at 1035.
The court in McQuitty clarified this uncertainty and delineated the
correct approach: a claim for lack of informed consent rests in
negligence, rather than battery. !d. at 29, 976 A.2d at 1036-37. The
court indicated that to require a physical invasion would contradict the
underlying basis for the informed consent doctrine, which is to
promote the patient's choice and personal autonomy. McQuitty, 410
Md. at 31, 976 A.2d at 1038. Accordingly, the court held that there
exists no requirement of a physical invasion in the informed consent
doctrine. !d. at 33, 976 A.2d at 1039.

142

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.1

By clarifying contradictory precedent, the court in McQuitty
reconnected the informed consent doctrine with its common law
origins in the law of negligence. The court reaffirmed the informed
consent doctrine's strength with regard to ensuring the patient's right
to make informed decisions about procedures and treatments that
personally affect the patient. Requiring a patient to show evidence of
battery in order to sustain an informed consent claim would have
severely limited the doctrine's power. Thus, without the requirement
of a physical invasion, a lower threshold exists for patients to bring
claims for lack of informed consent, allowing legal practitioners to
assert the patients' rights more readily. As a result of this decision, the
amount of successful informed consent cases may increase.

